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Executive Summary
West Virginia’s economy is concentrated in energy-producing and energy-consuming sectors. The
state’s energy-intensive economy evolved in response to abundant supplies of comparatively low-cost
energy — coal, natural gas, and electricity. Thus, the state and the welfare of its residents are
particularly sensitive to events that change the behavior of energy markets.
There are presently several prospective changes in public policy that could have large effects on coal
and electricity markets in West Virginia and nationally. A natural response to any of these recent or
prospective policies is to ask, “What kind of impacts will this have in West Virginia’s energy markets?”
Furthermore, “With the state economy so dependent on energy-intensive industries, what could this
policy do to broader measures of state economic activity, such as employment, GSP, personal
incomes, or population?” This report addresses those questions for EPA’s NOx SIP Call. Companion
reports examine the impacts on West Virginia’s economy of Phase II SO2 restrictions under Title IV of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and of the Kyoto Protocol.
The NOx SIP Call
Nitrogen oxides (NOx), together with volatile organic compounds (VOCs), are precursors of ozone
when exposed to sunlight in the lower levels of the atmosphere (troposphere). In order to reduce
regional transport of NOx and ozone, the EPA is requiring the District of Columbia and 22 states,
including West Virginia, to file revisions of their air quality State Implementation Plans (SIPs). The
revisions will have reduced budgets for NOx emissions during the May through September ozone
season beginning in 2003. This action is commonly referred to as the NOx SIP Call.
EPA constructed the new NOx budgets based on reductions in emissions from stationary point sources,
especially electric generating units (EGUs). The new budget for EGUs is based on a standard of 0.15
lbs/mmBtu. West Virginia’s total emissions are cut from 190,877 tons to 92,920 tons (51.3%) and its
EGU emissions from 115,490 tons to 26,439 tons (77.1%). West Virginia has the deepest cuts in both
total and EGU emissions.
There are four types of technology presently available to control EGU emissions of NOx from coalfired boilers. These are combustion controls, natural gas reburn, selective catalytic reduction (SCR),
and selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR).
Implementation of the NOx SIP Call and the related ozone regulations are presently tied up by court
challenges. In May 1999 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stayed the September
30, 1999 deadline for submission of the revised SIPS until the court rules on an appeal of the SIP Call
by several midwestern states, including West Virginia.
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Study Process
There are three basic elements that must be brought together in a specific logical sequence to produce
the impact estimates. The first of these is a model of West Virginia’s economy that consists of a
mathematical representation of the relationships among different parts of the economy — household
consumption, investment, production, employment, wages, prices, incomes, population migration,
production costs, and so forth. This study uses the REMI model of West Virginia’s economy. The
second basic element is a baseline scenario that describes what West Virginia’s economy would look
like without the NOx SIP Call. Running the baseline scenario through the REMI model creates a control
forecast. The third basic element in the study process is a policy scenario describing the direct effects
the NOx SIP Call would have on West Virginia’s economy. The study used four types of information to
develop the NOx SIP Call scenario. These were: 1) official descriptions of the NOx SIP Call in EPA
publications; 2) energy industry statistical profiles, primarily from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration; 3) prior studies of the NOx SIP Call or related proposals; and 4) advice from members
of an Advisory Board convened for the study. The final stage in the study process was to use the REMI
model to simulate an alternative forecast based on the NOx SIP Call scenario. Comparing the policy
scenario forecast with the control forecast reveals the estimated economic impacts of the NOx SIP
Call.
Economic impacts are changes in the level of activity or some other attribute (e.g., wage rates) of an
economy that are attributable to some policy or event. Impacts are not the same as benefits or costs. In
benefit-cost studies a benefit is the amount people would be willing to pay to make a specific event
happen or to acquire a good or service. A cost is the amount people would be willing to pay to avoid
occurrence of a specific event or to avoid giving up something of value. (This definition of cost is
different from, but related to, the common definition of cost as what someone pays to acquire
something.) An impact may be a benefit (lower food prices), a cost (increased incidence of illness
requires greater expenditures on health care), or neither (employment shifts from one industry to
another with no change in wage rates).
Direct Impact Scenario
The policy scenario of the NOx SIP Call’s direct impacts consists of several elements. First, in the short
run there will be additional investment in equipment and construction to install NOx control equipment at
electric generating plants. Second, the cost of producing coal-fired electricity will increase, either to
operate and amortize the NOx control equipment or to purchase NOx allowances to cover uncontrolled
excess emissions. This in turn leads to the third direct impact — the price of electricity in West Virginia
will increase, both in absolute terms and relative to national average prices.
The NOx SIP Call scenario can be summarized with values for capital expenditures on control
equipment, the price of NOx emission allowances, and the increase in the price of electricity compared
to baseline prices:
iii

Capital Costs:
$670 million
NOx Emission Allowance Price:
$1,950/ton
Electricity Price Increase:
2.6 mills/kWh
There are several direct impacts of the NOx SIP Call that are not included in this scenario because their
likely magnitudes are small and/or the information available to quantify them is limited. These include
shifts in the mix of fuels used to generate electricity, purchase of catalyst and ammonia or urea for
operation of emission controls, utility windfalls from distribution of emission allowances, reductions in
national electricity consumption due to higher prices, NOx emission controls at industrial (non-utility)
sources, labor productivity gains brought about by improved health, and improvements in agricultural
and forestry yields.
The NOx SIP Call direct impact scenario used in this report is a plausible representation of the effects
on West Virginia’s economy, but it does not represent a firm prediction of the actual direct impacts that
will occur. There are several sources of uncertainty. In light of pending litigation and the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals’ stay of the deadline for the states to file revised SIPs, the NOx SIP Call may never
be implemented or its content may be substantially altered. Even if the NOx SIP Call proceeds, the 22
affected states have a great deal of discretion in how they choose to meet their emission budgets set by
EPA. Third, other regulatory actions may effectively supercede, or dramatically alter the incremental
costs of, the SIP Call. There is also a good deal of uncertainty over the actual costs of retrofitting and
operating NOx emission controls.
Economic Impacts of the NOx SIP Call
Table ES below summarizes results from the study.
Table ES
Economic Impacts of NOx SIP Call
2000

2005

2010

2020

Output (millions of 1992 $)

87

-128

-178

-237

GSP (millions of 1992 $)

45

-75

-108

-145

1,200

-1,200

-1,500

-1,700

5

2

0

17

Wages & Salaries (millions $)

32

-31

-47

-65

Per Capita Income (1992 $)

10

-33

-20

-7

300

-800

-2,500

-4,000

Employment
Annual Wage Rate ($)

Population
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Introduction: West Virginia’s Energy Intensive Economy
West Virginia’s economy is concentrated in energy-producing and energy-consuming sectors. The
state’s energy-intensive economy evolved in response to abundant supplies of comparatively low-cost
energy — coal, natural gas, and electricity. For example, in 1997 industrial customers in West Virginia
paid an average of $2.91 per thousand cubic feet for natural gas compared to $3.59 nationally, 1 and in
1998 they paid an average of 3.8 ¢/kWh (cents per kilowatthour) for electricity compared to 4.5
¢/kWh nationally.2
Table 1 illustrates the importance of energy to West Virginia’s economy with data on employment,
employee earnings, and gross state product (GSP) for selected industries in 1997. Coal mining, oil and
gas extraction, natural gas distribution, and electricity are the state’s major energy-producing industries.
West Virginia sold 70.4% of its electricity generated in 1998 and 83.1% of its coal production in 1997
out-of-state.3 So in addition to being large, electricity and coal are important parts of the state’s export
base. The four manufacturing industries (out of twenty) in Table 1 each include sectors that spend over
5% of their revenues on electricity purchases. Primary aluminum spends 20.5%, cement 10.6%, carbon
and graphite products 5.5%, and reconstituted wood products 5.5% of revenues on electricity. 4
Combined, just the eight listed energy-intensive industries accounted for 9.7% of employment, 24.0%
of employee earnings, and 27.1% of GSP in the entire state economy!
Because large parts of West Virginia’s economy are based on abundant, low-cost energy, the state and
the welfare of its residents are particularly sensitive to events that change the behavior of energy
markets. There are presently several prospective changes in public policy that could have large effects
on coal and electricity markets in West Virginia and nationally. Most, but not all, of these are proposed
or pending environmental regulations. These prospective policy changes include: 1) the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call, which would
require the state to reduce NOx emissions; 2) the start in 2000 of Phase II of the1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments (CAAA) restrictions on SO2 emissions to control acid rain; 3) the Kyoto Protocol to limit
emissions of greenhouse gases, notably CO2; 4) additional restrictions on the scope of mountaintop
removal coal mining and associated valley fills; 5) restructuring of electricity markets and the

1

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Annual 1997, October 1998, Table

27.
2

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1998 Volume 1, Table

A15.
3

Computed from data in U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual
1998 Volume 1, Tables A1 and A11 and Coal Industry Annual 1997, Tables 61 and 62.
4

Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 1994 U.S. Structural Matrices.
1

introduction of competition;5 and 6) rail competition leading to lower costs of transporting low-sulfur
coal from Wyoming’s Powder River Basin. A natural response to any of these recent or prospective
policies is to ask, “What kind of impacts will this have in West Virginia’s energy markets?”
Furthermore, “With the state economy so dependent on energy-intensive industries, what could this
policy do to broader measures of state economic activity, such as employment, GSP, personal
incomes, or population?”
This report addresses those questions for EPA’s NOx SIP Call. Companion reports examine the
impacts on West Virginia’s economy of Phase II SO2 restrictions under Title IV of the CAAA and of
the Kyoto Protocol. 6 The next section describes the NOx SIP Call. The following section gives an
overview of the process used in this study, including subsections describing the REMI model of West
Virginia’s economy, and discussing the nature and interpretation of impacts. The fourth section details
the scenario used to describe the NOx SIP Call’s direct impacts and contains a subsection about
potential alternatives to the selected scenario. The body of the report concludes with total (economywide) impact estimates for a variety of variables. An appendix covers some of the technical details
encountered in developing the direct impact scenario.

The NOx SIP Call
Nitrogen oxides (NOx), together with volatile organic compounds (VOCs), are precursors of ozone
when exposed to sunlight in the lower levels of the atmosphere (troposphere).7 Ozone, in turn, is a
component of smog and one of the “criteria” air pollutants regulated in the national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) established under the Clean Air Act and administered by the EPA. Many areas in
the northeast and mid-Atlantic states have had continuing difficulty meeting the NAAQS ozone
standards. This has prompted increased attention to regional (i.e., long-distance) transport of ozone and
its precursors, especially NOx.
5

For more on issues pertaining to electric industry restructuring in West Virginia, see West
Virginia University, Electric Industry Restructuring Research Group, Electric Industry Restructuring:
Opportunities and Risks for West Virginia, Reports 1-5, various dates July 1997 through September
1998.
6

Greenstreet, David, Impacts of Phase II SO2 Emission Restrictions on West Virginia’s
Economy, West Virginia University, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, December 1999 and
Greenstreet, David, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on West Virginia’s Economy, West Virginia
University, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, December 1999.
7

Tropospheric ozone is a pollutant that causes respiratory ailments, among other problems. It
should not be confused with high elevation, stratospheric ozone. Stratospheric ozone occurs naturally,
shields the earth’s surface from ultraviolet radiation, and has been depleted in recent years by other
pollutants, notably chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).
2

In order to reduce regional transport of NOx and ozone, the EPA is requiring the District of Columbia
and 22 states, including West Virginia, to file revisions of their air quality State Implementation Plans
(SIPs) with reduced budgets for NOx emissions during the May through September ozone season
beginning in 2003.8 This action is commonly referred to as the NOx SIP Call. Each state’s new NOx
budget is based on projected emissions from a variety of sources including electric generating units
(EGUs), industrial and commercial boilers, stationary combustion turbines, other stationary point
sources, area sources (open burning and small industrial, commercial, and residential fuel combustion),
highway vehicle sources, and nonroad mobile sources.9 The EPA constructed its new budgets based on
reductions in emissions from stationary point sources, especially EGUs. The new budget for EGUs is
based on a standard of 0.15 lbs/mmBtu. However, the states’ revised SIPs may allocate NOx
emissions in any manner that complies with their total budgets. For the entire 22-state region, ozoneseason NOx emissions are supposed to be reduced from 4,179,728 tons projected in 2007 to
3,023,116 tons under the SIP Call — a 27.7% reduction. 10 EGU emissions are reduced from
1,501,775 tons to 543,826 tons — a 63.8% reduction. West Virginia’s total emissions are cut from
190,877 tons to 92,920 tons (51.3%) and its EGU emissions from 115,490 tons to 26,439 tons
(77.1%). West Virginia has the deepest cuts in both total and EGU emissions, because a large
proportion of the state’s NOx emissions are from EGUs and most of the state’s EGUs are old enough
to have been grandfathered out of other NOx controls that the Clean Air Act now imposes on electric
generating plants.
As a supplement to the SIP Call, the EPA is offering the states an optional regional cap and trade
program that would allow trading of NOx emission allowances among EGUs and other major stationary
sources throughout the region.11 This is modeled on the SO2 allowance trading program under Title IV

8

The states have primary responsibility for enforcing air pollution standards to attain the
NAAQS. Under Section 110 of the Clean Air Act each state files a SIP for approval at the EPA to
ensure that national standards and regulations are met. States have flexibility in designing and
implementing their plans, but the EPA can impose sanctions or intervene directly if the SIP is inadequate
or progress towards complying with the NAAQS does not meet timetables in the Act.
9

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, Federal Register, 63(207), October 27, 1999 and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the NOx SIP Call, FIP, and
Section 126 Petitions: Volume 1: Costs and Economic Impacts, September 1998, Chapter 3.
10

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Development of Modeling Inventory and Budgets
for Regional NOx SIP Call, September 24, 1998, Table VI-1.
11

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of
3

of the CAAA and would reduce total compliance costs by allowing the NOx emission reductions to be
made in whatever ways are least expensive.
There are four types of technology presently available to control EGU emissions of NOx from coalfired boilers. These are combustion controls, natural gas reburn, selective catalytic reduction (SCR),
and selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR).12 Combustion controls consist primarily in using lowNOx burners in the boilers. The incremental operating costs are much lower than the other alternatives,
but NOx emissions can still be as high as 0.675 lbs/mmBtu depending on the type of boiler and other
conditions. Natural gas reburn uses a second stage of combustion with the first stage flue gases and
natural gas. Capital costs are reasonable and the natural gas provides additional Btu’s at competitive
cost. On the other hand, NOx removal rates are only on the order of 40% to 60%, and current
applications are primarily in moderately-sized demonstration projects. SNCR is based on injecting
ammonia or urea into the flue gases. Capital costs are low and operating costs are moderate. Ammonia
slip (emission of residual ammonia) is a concern, and there is debate over the maximum feasible unit size
— utilities are claiming a maximum size of approximately 350 MW while the EPA’s cost estimates
assume SNCR is feasible up to 500 MW. SNCR’s NOx removal rates vary from 30% to 50%. SCR
also uses ammonia injection, but entails passing the flue gas across a catalyst. This reduces ammonia
slip and increases the rate of NOx reduction to 80% or more.13 SCR is feasible in units larger than
500MW, but capital costs are considerably greater than for the other alternatives.
The NOx SIP Call is one of four intertwined regulatory proceedings underway at the EPA regarding
NOx and ozone. The EPA has issued a regulation that will change the NAAQS ozone standard from
0.12 parts per million averaged hourly to 0.08 parts per million averaged over 8 hours.14 Second, eight
states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Vermont) have petitioned the EPA under Section 126 to restrict NOx emissions from stationary
sources in upwind states that “significantly contribute to ozone nonattainment problems in the petitioning

Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, Federal Register, 63(207), October 27, 1999 and
Napolitano, Sam, Economic Impact of the NOx SIP Call on Electric Power Generation, Electric
Utilities Environment Conference, January 1999.
12

This paragraph is based largely on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Analyszing
Electric Power Under the CAAA, 1996, Appendix 5 and Energy Ventures Analysis, At What Cost?,
November 1995.
13

AOI Consulting estimates removal efficiencies ranging from 60% to 90% (William Pollock,
private communication, May 25, 1999).
14

The one-hour standard could be exceeded three days in a three-year period before triggering
nonattainment status. The new eight-hour standard will be applied using a three year average of the
fourth highest daily maximum.
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State.” The EPA has determined that sources in the District of Columbia and 21 states, including West
Virginia, contribute significantly to ozone problems in at least one of the petitioning states.15 Third, the
EPA has initiated proceedings for a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) that would impose the same
NOx emission budgets mandated in the NOx SIP Call. The Section 126 petitions and FIP are alternate
regulatory processes for imposing some or all of the NOx emission reductions contained in the SIP Call.
The NAAQS revision is relevant because in some instances the new eight-hour standard was used to
define nonattainment areas justifying the SIP Call and the Section 126 petitions.
The NOx SIP Call is the culmination of a series of developments in the control of regional transport of
ozone. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) recognized regional transport as an issue and
imposed “reasonably available control technology” standards throughout an Ozone Transport Region
(OTR) consisting of 11 northeastern states plus the District of Columbia and northern Virginia. The
CAAA also created an Ozone Transport Commission to develop strategies for reducing ozone
throughout the OTR. In September 1994 the OTC member states, except Virginia, signed a
Memorandum of Understanding imposing additional restrictions on stationary NOx sources.
Meanwhile, in 1995 the EPA required a new “consultative process to address regional transport” as a
condition for extending SIP filing deadlines for several states having difficulty meeting the NAAQS
standards. Consequently, in March 1995 the Environmental Council of the States convened the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group (OTAG), a modeling and consultative group consisting of the 32 states
east of the Mississippi, with participation by EPA and other interested parties. After considerable
modeling of regional ozone transport, in June 1997 OTAG issued its findings. OTAG’s
recommendations included additional modeling and analysis as well as enhanced NOx emission
standards. For EGUs in the 22-state “fine grid” sub-region, OTAG advocated NOx emission limits of
the less stringent of 85% reduction from 1990 levels or 0.15 lbs/mmBtu. This was followed by the
Section 126 petitions in August 1997, EPA’s announcement in October 1997 of intent to issue a SIP
Call based on OTAG’s findings, and EPA’s final SIP Call rule in September 1998.
Implementation of the NOx SIP Call and the related ozone regulations are presently tied up by court
challenges. On May 14, 1999, in a case filed by the American Trucking Associations, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the EPA was reading Clean Air Act provisions “so
loosely as to render them unconstitutional delegations of legislative power” and remanded the revised
NAAQS ozone standards back to the EPA to develop a clearer statutory justification. EPA is
appealing this ruling. Later in May the same court stayed the September 30, 1999 deadline for
submission of the revised SIPS until the court rules on an appeal of the SIP Call by several midwestern
states, including West Virginia. In June the EPA stayed its final action on the Section 126 petitions until
November 30 in order to separate the proceeding from the related court cases and to rely on only the
one-hour ozone NAAQS.
15

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking
on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport; Proposed Rule,”
Federal Register, 63(203), October 21, 1998, page 56303.
5

Study Process
Figure 1, provided by REMI, summarizes the process for estimating economic impacts used in this
study. There are three basic elements that must be brought together in a specific logical sequence to
produce the impact estimates. The first of these is a model of West Virginia’s economy that consists of
a mathematical representation of the relationships among different parts of the economy — household
consumption, investment, production, employment, wages, prices, incomes, population migration,
production costs, and so forth. This permits analysis of how a change in one part of the economy, an
increase in electricity prices for example, propagates throughout the entire economy by way of these
relationships. This study uses the REMI model of West Virginia’s economy, as represented by the
center box in Figure 1.16 The following subsection describes the structure of the REMI model in more
detail.
The second basic element is a baseline scenario that describes what West Virginia’s economy would
look like without the NOx SIP Call. The upper right-side box in Figure 1 shows that this baseline
scenario is described in terms of values of policy variables. Policy variables consist of the settings —
equation parameters, initial values of economic variables, and forecasts of exogenous conditions in the
national economy — that the REMI model uses as input in order to simulate an annual forecast of the
state’s economy. The control forecast represented in the lower right-side box is simulated from the
baseline scenario’s predicted values for policy variables. REMI comes with a default baseline scenario
and control forecast extrapolated from current economic conditions without any changes in public
policy or external factors.
For this study the baseline scenario and control forecast contain one change from the REMI default.
Coal from Wyoming’s Powder River Basin (PRB) is inexpensive to mine and low in sulfur, but has a
high ash content and is remote from most markets. Due to improvements in rail transportation and finetuning of electric generating unit boilers, PRB coal is becoming increasingly competitive in Midwestern
and even Eastern markets. At the same time, inflation-adjusted national coal mine revenues will be flat
or decreasing. Even though tons of coal produced has increased at an annual average rate of 1.5%
nationally between 1988 and 1997 (2.0% in West Virginia), falling prices mean that real (i.e. inflationadjusted) revenues have decreased at an annual average rate of -3.6% (-1.6% in West Virginia).17
Furthermore, there are almost no announced plans for investments in new coal-fired electric generating
units in spite of continued growth in the market for electricity.

16

The specific version is REMI Policy Insight, WV State Model EDFS-53, Version 1.0
released September 1998, which is calibrated with historical data through 1996.
17

Free on board adjusted to 1992 dollars using the implicit Gross Domestic Product deflator.
Calculated from U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Industry Annual 1997, Tables 1 and
81.
6

Consequently, REMI’s baseline forecast of 1.0% annual growth from 1996 to 2020 in West Virginia
real coal revenues appears much too optimistic. Instead, the adjusted baseline forecast for this study
assumes that real revenues from in-state and foreign coal shipments remain steady. Revenues from outof-state domestic coal shipments are assumed to decrease from 1996 by 5% in 2000, 15% by 2010,
and 20% by 2020. Since 1997 domestic out-of-state coal shipments were 60.75% of all coal
shipments originating in West Virginia,18 this amounts to a decrease of 3.0% in real coal output by
2000, 9.1% by 2010, and 12.2% by 2020.
The third basic element in the study process is a policy scenario describing the direct effects that the
NOx SIP Call would have on West Virginia’s economy. This is the top box in Figure 1. The upper leftside box shows that this scenario has to be expressed in terms of the REMI model’s policy variables.
The study used four types of information to develop the NOx SIP Call scenario and to translate that
scenario into policy variables that can be inserted into a REMI simulation. These were: 1) official
descriptions of the NOx SIP Call in EPA publications; 2) energy industry statistical profiles, primarily
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration; 3) prior studies of the NOx SIP Call or related
proposals; and 4) advice from members of an Advisory Board convened for the study.
This study’s Advisory Board consisted of 21 individuals with a background in some aspect of West
Virginia’s energy markets or environmental policy. The members had diverse backgrounds including
state environmental and utility regulatory officials, representatives of the West Virginia Legislature and
Governor’s Office, electric utility staff, railroad coal market managers, representatives of mining and
manufacturing trade associations, an engineering consultant, a private lawyer specializing in
environmental issues, a union representative, members of environmental advocacy groups, and
academics. Fifteen of the Advisory Board members attended an afternoon seminar that included a
discussion of the NOx SIP Call and the probable magnitudes of its direct impacts on the state economy.
Several members provided specific information based on their professional knowledge and/or
references to additional reports and sources of information. Each Advisory Board member received a
draft copy of this report for review. 19
The final stage in the study process, as represented by the lower left-side and bottom boxes in Figure 1,
is to use the REMI model to simulate an alternative forecast based on the NOx SIP Call scenario.
Comparing the scenario forecast with the control forecast reveals the estimated economic impacts of
the NOx SIP Call. These impacts were estimated for each year through 2020 and cover all the various
18

Computed from U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Industry Annual 1997,
Tables 58 and 61.
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Advisory Board members do not necessarily endorse the study’s conclusions. While many of
their comments were helpful, the author has sole responsibility for the final choices made in selecting the
policy scenario and estimating economic impacts.
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variables — household consumption, investment, production, employment, wages, prices, incomes,
population migration, production costs, and so forth — forecast by the REMI model.
The REMI Model
REMI is an economic-demographic forecasting and simulation model with thousands of equations and
policy variables. REMI is designed to forecast the impact of public policies and external events on the
state’s economy and population. As described in Figure 1 earlier in this section, any combination of the
policy variables can be modified to simulate the economic and demographic impacts of a policy
scenario. REMI includes blocks on: 1) output; 2) labor and capital demand; 3) population and labor
supply; 4) wages, prices, and profits; and 5) market shares.
Figure 2 schematically represents the major variables in each of these blocks and the relationships
among these variables. In Block 1, output in each of 53 sectors is determined by demand —
consumption, investment, government spending, and exports — and local market shares. Block 2
shows that factor demands for labor and capital depend on outputs and the wage rate. The real wage
rate and employment opportunities determine migration, and therefore population (by age and sex) and
labor supply in Block 3. In the fourth block employment demand and labor supply determine
employment opportunity and the wage rate. The wage rate, in turn, drives the real wage and production
costs, which determine profitability and prices, which affect consumer prices, which loop back to the
wage rate. In Block 5, local and export market shares depend on sectors’ profitability and sales prices.
Interpreting Impacts
Economic impacts are changes in the level of activity or some other attribute (e.g., wage rates) of an
economy that are attributable to some policy or event. Because an economy has many different
characteristics — output, employment, wage rates, prices, incomes — any policy will have many
different types of impacts. Regional economists distinguish between direct and total impacts. A direct
impact is any change in an economy whose immediate cause is the policy or event in question. In this
study direct impacts are represented as changes in the REMI policy variables, which make the policy
scenario forecast differ from the control forecast. A total impact is the final change in a characteristic of
the economy after all of the indirect influences work their way through the various components and
markets of the economy. With REMI, these total impacts are equivalent to differences between the
policy scenario and control forecasts.
Impacts are not the same as benefits or costs. In benefit-cost studies a benefit is the amount people
would be willing to pay to make a specific event happen or to acquire a good or service. A cost is the
amount people would be willing to pay to avoid occurrence of a specific event or to avoid giving up
something of value. The terms “benefit” and “cost” are also applied to the specific event, good, or
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service, itself.20 Generally, benefits are based on either intrinsic value to a consumer (shoes, a car, more
leisure, cleaner air), or resources saved in an existing activity so that the resources can then be used for
something else (drivers’ time saved because of a road improvement). Costs generally derive from
something intrinsically undesirable (increased incidence of an illness), a reduction in something with
value, or something that increases the resources required for an existing activity.
Public policies should generally be justified in terms of their benefits exceeding costs. The payments do
not actually have to happen as long as individuals would be hypothetically willing to make them.
Benefits and costs may or may not be tradable in markets. An impact may be a benefit (lower food
prices), a cost (increased incidence of illness requires greater expenditures on health care), or neither
(employment shifts from one industry to another with no change in wage rates). Even when an impact is
associated with a benefit, their magnitudes need not be the same (a previously unemployed worker
gains a job — the job pays a salary [an impact] but is not worth as much to the worker because she
also loses leisure time).
This study addresses the potential economic impacts of the NOx SIP Call. It makes no attempt to
assess the benefits or costs. In the case of the NOx SIP Call, it happens that most of the costs, but not
the benefits, are tradable and appear in economic markets (e.g., operating expenses for an SCR) and
are therefore observable as economic impacts. This does not mean the benefits are not real; just that
they are not as closely associated with the impacts that can be modeled with the techniques used in this
study. Taking a related example, the EPA estimates that the incremental health and welfare benefits of
revising the ozone NAAQS from 0.12 parts per million to 0.08 parts per million would be between
$0.4 billion and $2.1 billion annually (1990 prices).21

Direct Impact Scenario
The SIP Call’s tightened restrictions on utility NOx emissions would have several direct impacts on
West Virginia’s economy. These direct impacts are quantified in the scenario described in this

20

To see the connection between an economist’s definition of cost and the common definition,
consider the example of an individual who pays a dollar (common definition of cost) to buy an ice
cream cone on a hot day. Since a dollar is worth a dollar, the individual would be willing to pay up to a
dollar (economist’s definition of cost) in order to get the ice cream cone for “free” (i.e., to avoid giving
up the dollar used to pay for the cone). The individual may have been willing to pay up to two dollars
for the cone, making two dollars the benefit. If the individual had only been willing to pay up to fifty
cents for the cone, the purchase would not be made.
21

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analyses for the Particulate
Matter and Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Proposed Regional Haze Rule,
July 1997, page 12-1.
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section. This direct policy impact scenario can then be inserted into a REMI simulation in order to
estimate the indirect and total impacts the NOx SIP Call might have on the state’s economy.
Scenario Elements
First, in the short run there will be additional investment in equipment and construction to install NOx
control equipment at electric generating plants. Second, the cost of producing coal-fired electricity will
increase compared to the baseline scenario, either to operate and amortize the NOx control equipment
or to purchase NOx allowances to cover uncontrolled excess emissions. This increase in electricity
production costs will be greater in West Virginia than on average nationally, because the state’s
electricity generation capacity is almost entirely coal-fired and because 28 states are not in the SIP Call
region. This in turn leads to the third direct impact; the price of electricity in West Virginia will increase,
both in absolute terms and relative to national average prices. For businesses, especially electricityintensive manufacturing industries, this means an increase in operating costs which will lead to some loss
in competitiveness. For households, this means a higher cost of living that effectively reduces the value
of real incomes.
The NOx SIP Call scenario can be summarized with values for capital expenditures on control
equipment, the price of NOx emission allowances, and the increase in the price of electricity compared
to baseline prices:
Capital Costs:
$670 million
NOx Emission Allowance Price:
$1,950/ton
Electricity Price Increase:
2.6 mills/kWh
These translate into the following direct impacts entered into the REMI simulation:
Construction of Electric Utility Facilities:
$67 million/year in 2000-2002
Public Utilities Production Costs:
+2.0% starting in 2003
Industrial Electricity Costs:
+3.4% starting in 2003
Commercial Electricity Costs:
+2.4% starting in 2003
Price of Household Operating Expenses:
+0.8% starting in 2003
The public utilities production costs as well as the industrial and commercial electricity costs are each
expressed as changes in West Virginia relative to the nation. For example, if West Virginia industrial
electricity prices increased 10% while national industrial electricity prices went up an average of 5%,
the REMI industrial electricity price would go up approximately 5% ({[1.10/1.05]-1}*100).
This scenario is based on a combination of industry statistics, engineering estimates of NOx control
costs, forecasts of NOx emission allowance prices, and utility NOx control expenditure plans.
Interested readers can find a description of the scenario’s development in the appendix.
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Elements Not Included
There are some additional potential direct effects of the SIP Call that are not considered in this report
because their likely magnitude is small and/or the information available to quantify them is limited.
Nevertheless, they should be noted for completeness. First, utility consumption of fuels — notably coal
and natural gas — may change since natural gas does not have the NOx emission problems of coal and
using natural gas to cofire with coal can even reduce emissions. However, the EPA forecasts that in
2007 implementing the NOx SIP Call would decrease Eastern U.S. coal production by only 0.9% and
increase national natural gas production by just 4.1%.22 Second, operating the controls will consume
inputs, primarily catalyst and ammonia or urea, but these are likely to come from out-of-state. Third,
complying with NOx emission limits could require “environmental redispatch” — that is, substituting
power from low-emission generating plants for higher emission coal-fired plants. However, this
potential logistical constraint is transformed into a production cost issue by both a market in tradable
emission allowances and by the widespread adoption of NOx control equipment. These changes to
electricity production costs are accounted for in the scenario.
Fourth, under competitive markets electric generators receive a windfall when emission allowances are
allocated to them. This is true even for a utility that uses rather than sells its allowances, because
competitive prices of electricity will reflect the opportunity cost of the allowance, no matter how
acquired. This windfall does not apply under rate of return regulation, and shareholders who do benefit
from the windfall will be scattered across the country. Therefore, the income impacts in West Virginia
will be small.
Fifth, the general increase in electricity prices will moderately reduce national consumption of electricity.
Other forms of energy will replace electricity, industry and commerce will substitute other inputs for
energy and energy-intensive inputs, and consumers will substitute away from electricity and energyintensive purchases. There are two ways that changes in national electricity consumption can have a
direct impact on West Virginia’s economy — changes in exports of coal or electricity. Both of these
are already accounted for in the scenario for other reasons. Coal exports are reduced because of
competition from all other fuels, notably low-sulfur Powder River Basin Coal. The REMI model
simulates a reduction in the state’s out-of-state electricity sales in response to its increased relative cost
of producing electricity. In addition, changes in West Virginia’s electricity prices are part of the scenario
modeled.
Sixth, the SIP Call NOx emission budgets cover parts of the economy beyond electric generating units.
These include industrial boilers, which are common in the chemicals and primary metals industries;

22

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the NOx SIP Call,
FIP, and Section 126 Petitions; Volume 1: Costs and Economic Impacts, September 1998, page
6-35.
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stationary internal combustion engines, used primarily in natural gas compressor stations; cement kilns;
and other miscellaneous industrial sources. In 1995 West Virginia had 30 industrial boilers, 35 fixed
internal combustion engines, 3 cement kilns, and 21 other identified industrial sources of NOx
emissions.23 While tightened NOx emission standards for these sources may be significant in individual
cases, in aggregate they represent a considerably smaller share of NOx emissions and estimated
compliance costs than the electric generating units.
Finally, implementation of the NOx SIP Call would reduce ozone in West Virginia’s atmosphere. Some
of the benefits from the ozone reduction can lead to economic impacts.24 First, health of the state’s
labor force will improve.25 This, in turn, is likely to improve productivity and, consequently, both
employee earnings and business competitiveness. Second, reductions in ozone would reduce the extent
of ozone-induced damage to the state’s agricultural crops and forests.26 Thus, the output and
productivity of West Virginia’s agricultural and forest products sectors would improve. Unfortunately,
while ozone’s health effects and ability to damage crops are well documented, this study found no
references that quantify the resulting economic impacts in West Virginia.
23

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the NOx SIP Call,
FIP, and Section 126 Petitions; Volume 1: Costs and Economic Impacts, September 1998, pages
3-12 and 3-15.
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James Kotcon of the study Advisory Board deserves credit for drawing the author’s attention
to these impacts.
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One recent study — Abt Associates, Adverse Health Effects Associated with Ozone in the
Eastern United States, October 1999, Exhibit 4-7, available at
http://www.cleanair.net/outofbreath.htm — estimates that ozone was responsible for 650 hospital
admissions, 1,770 emergency room visits, and 58,000 asthma attacks in West Virginia during the 1997
ozone season. See also Burtraw, Dallas, et al, The Costs and Benefits of Reducing Acid Rain,
Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 97-31-REV, September 1997.
26

See for example Kopp, Raymond J. et al, “Implications of Environmental Policy for U.S.
Agriculture: the Case of Ambient Ozone Standards,” 1985; Pye, John M., “Impact of Ozone on the
Growth and Yield of Trees: A Review,” Journal of Environmental Quality, July-September 1988,
17(3), pages 347-360; Grant, William B., “The Role of Air Pollution in the Decline and Excess
Mortality of Oaks and Hickories in the Eastern U.S.,” in W. E. Sharpe and J. R. Drohan, eds., The
Effects of Acidic Deposition on Pennsylvania’s Forests, Environmental Resources Research
Institute, 1999; Gilliam, Frank S. and Nicole L. Turrill, “Temporal Patterns of Ozone Pollution in West
Virginia: Implications for High-Elevation Hardwood Forests” Journal of the Air & Waste
Management Association, August 1995, 45, pages 621-626; and Davis, Donald D. and John M.
Skelly, “Growth Response of Four Species of Eastern Hardwood Seedlings Exposed to Ozone, Acidic
Precipitation, and Sulfur Dioxide,” Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association, March
1992, 42(3), pages 309-311.
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Uncertainties
The NOx SIP Call direct impact scenario used in this report is a plausible representation of the effects
on West Virginia’s economy, but it does not represent a firm prediction of the actual direct impacts that
will occur. There are several sources of uncertainty. In light of pending litigation and the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals’ stay of the deadline for the states to file revised SIPs, the NOx SIP Call may never
be implemented or its content may be substantially altered. Even if the NOx SIP Call proceeds, the 22
affected states have a great deal of discretion in how they choose to meet their emission budgets set by
EPA. EPA is advocating and offering to help administer a region-wide emission allowance trading
scheme, but West Virginia may or may not choose that option. Third, other regulatory actions may
effectively supercede, or dramatically alter the incremental costs of, the SIP Call. In particular, the EPA
is now arguing that many of the old coal-fired generating plants in the region should be subject to the
much more rigorous NOx emission standards applied to new sources because of alleged plant upgrades
made over the years.27
There is also a good deal of uncertainty over the actual costs of retrofitting and operating NOx emission
controls. Several sets of engineering cost estimates have been published.28 Costs to control NOx
emissions at individual electric generation plants will depend on a variety of factors including capacity,
boiler type, fuel characteristics, overall plant layout, and amount of NOx removed which drives choice
of control technology (e.g., SCR versus SNCR). Even when controlling for unit capacity and type of
control, cost estimates vary. For example, to install SCR on a 200 MW unit, estimates of capital costs
range from $69/kW (EPA and ICAC) to $85/kW (UARG), fixed annual operating costs from
$2.13/kW (ICAC) to $6.13/kW (EPA and UARG), and variable costs from 0.38 mills/kWh (EPA,
UARG, and ICAC) to 0.85 mills/kWh (EVA).29 Capital and fixed annual costs are somewhat lower for
larger units; for example, EPA estimates $50/kW for a 500MW unit.
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Maize, Kennedy, “EPA Move on Plants Smells Peculiar,” The Electricity Daily, July 19,

1999.
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Analyzing Electric Power Generation Under the
CAAA, 1996, Appendix 5; Energy Ventures Analysis, At What Cost?, November 1995; Utility Air
Regulatory Group (UARG) and Institute for Clean Air Companies (ICAC) as quoted in E3 Ventures,
An Environmental and Economic Assessment of NOx Controls for Eastern U.S. Electric
Generating Facilities Concurrent with Electricity Deregulation, September 1997, page A-2. The
author also had access to unpublished estimates from William Pollock of AOI Consulting.
29

All values cited in this sentence are in 1995 prices.
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Estimates of the price for tradable NOx allowances and of average cost effectiveness of the proposed
NOx restrictions, which are both closely tied to control cost estimates, show similar variability. EPA
forecasts an average cost per ton of NOx removed in 2007 at $1,503 (1990 prices);30 EVA predicts
that in 2007 with allowance trading the average cost per ton in West Virginia will be $2,766 (1996
prices);31 RDI estimates a range of possible allowance prices from $2,300 to $3,800 per ton depending
on the costs of installing SCR;32 and Zinder and Cichanowicz calculate that the marginal cost of NOx
reduction in West Virginia will be $4,068 per ton (1996 prices).33 Another point of comparison is the
already extant market for NOx emission allowances in the region covered by the Ozone Transport
Commission’s Memorandum of Understanding. Those allowances have been trading recently in a range
from $4,500 to $7,600 per ton. 34
Potential future developments in the market for NOx control equipment may also influence the actual
control costs that emerge. On the one hand, a surge in demand between now and 2003 for SCR and
SNCR equipment, installation, and catalyst may push up prices during precisely the period when
electricity producers in the region would have to be purchasing them. On the other hand, there are
some technological improvements — notably in-duct SCR — that could be commercially available
before 2003 under the push of favorable market conditions for NOx control equipment.
For those sources that infer an impact on the average and/or marginal cost of producing electricity, the
range of disagreement over NOx control costs (as well as over the feasibility of using SNCR on larger
units) leads to a similarly broad range of estimates of the impact on electricity costs. EPA estimates an
average compliance cost of 0.7 mills/kWh and a marginal cost of 1.0 mills/kWh (1990 prices), which
lead to predicted increases in electricity prices of 1.2% under cost of service regulation and 1.6% under
competition.35 Modeling a slightly different scenario (37 states, NOx emission standard of 0.15

30

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Addendum to the Regulatory Impact Analysis for
the NOx SIP Call, FIP, and Section 126 Petitions, Volume 1, September 1998, page ADD-2.
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Energy Ventures Analysis, How Much More?, May 1997, page 17.
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Resources Data International, Emission Markets in the U.S., as reported in Coal Age, June

1999.
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H. Zinder & Associates and J.E. Cichanowicz, Inc., Evaluation of Alternative NOx
Emission Caps in the 22-State SIP Region, June 1998, page 16.
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Resources Data International, Emission Markets in the U.S., as reported in Coal Age, June

1999.
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the NOx SIP Call,
FIP, and Section 126 Petitions, Volume 1: Costs and Economic Impacts, September 1998, pages
6-26 and 6-30; and Napolitano, Sam, “Economic Impact of the NOx SIP Call on Electric Power
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lbs/MMBtu or 85% reduction) EVA estimates average costs of 6.0 mills/kWh without trading and
supplies cost estimates with trading that imply 4.0 mills/kWh (1996 prices).36 A NESCAUM report
estimates that installing SCR on a 330 MW coal-fired plant for seasonal reduction of NOx emissions to
0.15 lbs/mmBtu would add between 1.1 and 3.4 mills/kWh (1996 prices) to the costs of electric
generation, depending on boiler type, capacity utilization, and a range of plausible capital and operating
costs.37

Economic Impacts of the NOx SIP Call
Figures 3 through 9 and Tables 2 through 8 summarize the NOx SIP Call’s estimated economic impacts
on output, gross state product (GSP), employment, wage rates, total wage and salary earnings,
personal incomes, and population in West Virginia. The figures graph totals for both the baseline and
NOx SIP Call scenarios for each year from 1997 through 2020. The tables report results for the
illustrative years of 1997, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. The tables also include industry division
detail except for personal income and population, which includes age cohort detail.
General Observations
Four general observations apply across the impacted variables:
! The timing of the impacts reflects the timing of the NOx SIP Call scenario. There are no impacts
until 2000, which is the first year that the policy scenario deviates from the baseline scenario.
From 2000 through 2002 the impacts are positive, reflecting the stimulus from installation of
NOx emission control equipment. Starting in 2003 and continuing through the end of the
forecast period in 2020, the impacts turn negative in response to the effects of electricity’s
increased costs.
! Growth in output, GSP, and especially employment shows a temporary slowdown in 1999.
This is the result of a national slowdown — forecast annual GDP growth of 2.0% compared to
an average annual rate of 2.6% over the 1996 to 2010 period.
! The magnitudes of the impacts are very small compared to the overall size of the state’s
economy. In Figures 6 (annual wage rate), 7 (wages and salaries), and 8 (per capita personal
income), the NOx SIP Call graph is indistinguishable from the graph of the control forecast.

Generation,” Electric Utilities Environment Conference, January 1999, page 7. EPA reasonably
connects average cost with price changes under cost of service and marginal cost with price changes
under competition.
36

Energy Ventures Analysis, How Much More?, May 1997, pages 7-8.
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Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management, Status Report on NOx: Control
Technologies and Cost Effectiveness for Utility Boilers, June 1998, Table S-2a, available at
http://www.nescaum.org/pdf/execsum_nox.pdf.
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Even for output (-0.29% in 2020), GSP (-0.28% in 2020), population
(-0.24% in 2020), and employment (-0.19% in 2020) the largest annual impacts are tiny. 38
! West Virginia’s economy would take a very long time to fully adjust to the impacts of the NOx
SIP Call. Even though the direct impacts in the scenario stay constant after 2003, the impacts
on output, GSP, employment, and population continue to grow every year until the end of the
forecast in 2020.39 There are two reasons that the economy responds so slowly. First, it takes
time for market shares of the state’s industries to change in response to the increase in
production costs. It also takes considerable time for the labor supply to adjust by means of outmigration.
Output and GSP
Output (Figure 3 and Table 2) and GSP (Figure 4 and Table 3) are both measures of the value of
production and behave in a similar fashion. The results are presented in 1992 dollars to remove the
effect of inflation over the extended period of the impact simulation. Output is the sum of the value of
goods and services produced by each business in the state. GSP is the value added by those businesses
while producing those goods and services. Output includes the value of purchased intermediate inputs
(parts, supplies, business services) that are embodied in a business’ product or service. GSP excludes
the value of those intermediate inputs and includes only the additional value that the business creates
with its factors of production (labor, capital, land).
! During the equipment installation phase of the NOx SIP Call scenario (2000-2002), the impacts
on output and GSP are positive. As can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, nearly three-quarters of this
impact in 2000 are in construction, which experiences the only direct impact during installation.
Recirculation of the additional construction revenues spreads indirect output and GSP impacts
across all of the other industry divisions (although in some cases these indirect impacts are so
small that they round to zero).
! Starting in 2003 when the price of electricity and its cost of production go up, the impacts on
output and GSP become negative. Approximately half these negative impacts happen in the
transportation and public utilities division, which includes electricity. Initially, demand for West
Virginia electricity falls for three reasons. The industry’s own market shares fall due to the
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Some care should be used in comparing one figure to another, because the scales on the
vertical axes were selected to cover growth over the forecast period, and predicted growth of some
variables is much more rapid than for others. For example, in Figure 5 the 50 thousand range of the
scale is less than 10% of the initial (1997) level of employment, while in Figure 7 the $30 billion range is
nearly double the initial wages and salaries. In percentage terms the impact on wages and salaries in
2020 (-0.16%) is almost as large as the impact on employment
(-0.19%), but it doesn’t look that way if the scales are ignored.
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The more complicated behavior of the wage rate, wages and salaries, and per capita income
are discussed below.
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increase in production costs. Its in-state industrial and commercial customers’ electricity
consumption falls because the price increase reduces their own market shares. Third,
households’ purchasing power goes down because electricity, and products made with
electricity, push up the cost of living. Over time losses of population and personal income also
reduce demand for the state’s products.
Employment
Employment impacts (Figure 5 and Table 4) parallel output and GSP impacts because businesses
employ workers in order to make their products.
! During the scenario’s equipment installation phase employment impacts are positive. The bulk
of the additional employment (69.8% in 2000) appears in construction.
! Once the cost of electricity goes up, the employment impacts turn negative. These are spread
more evenly among industry divisions than are the output and GSP impacts. The reason is that
the electricity sector is very capital-intensive, while some of the divisions affected by the general
reduction in population and incomes (retail, services) are more labor-intensive.
! In percentage terms, the impacts on employment are slightly smaller than the impacts on output
— -0.14% versus -0.19% in 2005, -0.17% versus -0.25% in 2010, and -0.19% versus 0.29% in 2020. The labor market’s initial reaction to cuts in employment is a reduction in the
wage rate, which induces businesses to keep some of the employees that would otherwise be
lost. However, in the long term, migration changes labor supply and reverses this effect.
Wages
The annual wage rates in Figure 6 and Table 5 are expressed in current dollars per employee. Total
wage and salary earnings (Figure 7 and Table 6) are also in current dollars for the entire West Virginia
economy. Total wages and salaries is the product of employment and the annual wage rate, so its
impacts depend on employment and wage rate impacts.
! The annual wage rate as well as total wages and salaries increase steadily in both the control
and NOx SIP Call scenarios. The annual wage rate starts at $20,295 in 1997 and increases to
over $45,600 by 2020. Total wage and salary earnings grow from $17.4 billion in 1997 to
$41.2 billion in 2020.
! During the equipment installation phase of the policy scenario (2000-2002), impacts on the
annual wage rate are positive (+0.04% in 2002) due to the increase in demand for labor. Once
the price of electricity goes up in 2003, the impact on wage rates gets smaller and then slightly
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negative from 2007 through 2009 in response to reduced demand for labor.40 After 2010 the
wage rate impacts are slightly positive again (+0.04% by 2020), because labor supply is
adjusting to reduced employment opportunities and the increased cost of living tends to push
wage rates up.
! From 2000 through 2002, the impact on total wages and salaries is positive (+0.16% each
year) since both employment and wage rates increase. After 2003 the impact on wages and
salaries is negative because the impacts on employment are larger than the impacts on wage
rates. However, after 2011 (-0.17%) these negative impacts start to get a little smaller due to
the slight increases in wage rates.
! During installation of control equipment, the wage rate and wage and salary earnings impacts
are largest in the construction sector. After 2003 the largest impacts are in transportation and
public utilities. The wage rate impact in transportation and public utilities remains negative even
when the aggregate impact becomes positive in later years. This happens because employment
demand decreases most in that sector.
Income
Personal income and per capita income expressed in constant dollars (1992 prices) are useful measures
of the population’s financial well-being (Figure 8 and Table 7). Personal income impacts depend on the
components of personal income, especially wages and salaries. Population changes also contribute to
impacts on per capita income.
! During the control equipment phase, the policy scenario’s impacts on total personal income and
per capita income are positive. Then when the effects of increased electricity prices kick in,
both impacts become negative. However, the negative impact on total personal income
continues to get larger, while the negative impact on per capita income in 2020 is only 18.0% of
what it was in 2003. Reductions in population and labor force explain this divergence in the two
trends.
! In the early years of the forecast, changes in wage and salary earnings explain almost all of the
impact on total personal income (99.2% in 2000 and 91.0% in 2005). Eventually, impacts on
proprietors’ income; dividends, interest, and rents; and transfer payments play a larger role, and
earnings impacts are not quite as important (60.7% in 2020).
! Even though real per capita income and disposable (i.e., after-tax) per capita income grow in
both the control and scenario forecasts, West Virginia’s disposable per capita income falls
further behind national per capita income. In 1997 the state’s disposable per capita income is
88.0% of the national average, but by 2020 it is only 81.5% in the control scenario forecasts.
40

The wage rate impact does not turn negative immediately, because it takes time for labor
demand to fully adjust to changes in production costs and then additional time for wage rates to fully
adjust to changes in labor demand.
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Population
Births, deaths, aging, and migration determine changes in West Virginia’s population (Figure 9 and
Table 8).
! Population impacts accumulate over extended periods of time as a result of migration. The
population impact is positive starting in 2000, reaches a maximum of +785 in 2002, and turns
negative in 2004. At the end of the forecast period the population impact is still growing — 72
more persons lost in 2020 than in 2019.
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Appendix: Computation of Scenario Values
There are two logically connected ways to approach the costs to electricity producers of the NOx SIP
Call — one based on costs of installing and operating control equipment and one based on anticipated
emission allowance prices. Once those compliance costs are estimated, they can be used to calculate
the impact on electricity prices using marginal costs in the case of competitive electricity markets or
average costs if rate of return regulation still applies. By 2003, most parts of the market for electric
generation will probably be competitive.41
With unrestrained and competitive trading, the price of allowances should equal the anticipated costs of
controlling a ton of NOx at the most expensive electric generating unit that chooses to install controls.
Units that would find it more expensive to install controls can save money by buying allowances and/or
reducing production during the ozone season; units that can control their NOx emissions for less than
the going price of allowances face lower costs by installing the control equipment than by buying
allowances. When deciding whether to install NOx control equipment, the allowance price would be
compared to the total control cost per ton of NOx, including amortizing the capital costs; once the
equipment is installed the choice to use it would depend only on the operating costs. The average total
cost per ton of NOx controled would always be less than the cost per ton at the most expensive unit
with controls, and thus should also be less than the allowance price. System-wide, the market would
drive up the price of allowances until units install controls to meet the aggregate NOx emission budgets.
Similarly, under competition the price of electricity would equal the marginal cost of production, that is,
the incremental cost of producing the most expensive kWh used.42 Under the NOx SIP Call, the cost of
producing that most expensive kWh will include some mix of costs for operating the NOx emission
control equipment and for using allowances for the remaining NOx emitted. If the mix of control and
allowance were efficient, then the cost of this mix should be the same as if allowances alone were used
for this last increment of NOx. Thus, the portion of an allowance consumed for that last NOx increment
times the allowance price would be the amount added to the marginal cost of producing electricity.43
41

Several states, including Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Ohio, have already passed electric
industry restructuring plans; the West Virginia Public Service Commission is presently conducting
hearings on features of a West Virginia restructuring plan; FERC Orders 888 and 889 have already
deregulated large parts of the electricity wholesale market; and both the Administration and key
legislators have released proposals for federal legislation.
42

There are complications involving long-run availability of generating capacity versus short-run
consumption of energy that are ignored here.
43

Because demand for electricity responds to changes in the price, the incremental kWh without
NOx SIP Call restrictions will not be the same as the incremental kWh under a scenario with those
restrictions. Thus, calculating electricity price changes based on allowance prices is strictly an upper
20

Under competition this would also be the amount added to the price of electricity. With rate of return
regulation, on the other hand, utilities are guaranteed a set rate of profit, and their averaged total
operating costs are one component of their regulated electricity prices. In this case the average total
costs of NOx control adjusted for any allowances purchased/sold would be added to the price of
electricity. Mathematically, this average cost of NOx control cannot be greater than the marginal cost of
NOx control that would be added to the competitive price of electricity.
With this reasoning in mind, it is possible to proceed with quantifying the direct impact scenario. The
Uncertainties subsection in the body of this report lists some published estimates of capital and
operating expenses for SCR. Start with capital expenditure of $75/kW and assume the NOx control
equipment has a 20-year lifespan and a discount rate of 8%. Then the annual cost of amortizing the
capital expenditure is:
$75*(0.08/(1-1.08-20)) = $7.64/kW
Add fixed annual operating costs of $6.13/kW:
$7.64+$6.13 = $13.77/kW
Assume a capacity utilization rate of 80% and convert to mills/kWh:
$13.77*1,000/(0.8*365*24) = 2.0 mills/kWh
Add variable operating costs of 0.6 mills/kWh pro rated for the five-month ozone season and a
moderate amount (say 0.3 mills/kWh) to go from average to marginal cost of installing and operating an
SCR:
2.0+0.6*(5/12)+0.3 = 2.6 mills/kWh
To take the alternative approach based on forecast NOx emission allowance prices, start by using West
Virginia’s ozone season baseline and SIP Call budget NOx emissions in 2007 to infer the state’s
average baseline NOx emission per mmBtu:44
0.15*(115,490/26,439) = 0.655 lbs NOx/mmBtu
Convert this value to mmBtu’s per ton of NOx emission:
2,000/0.655 = 3,053 mmBtu/ton NOx
To change units from mmBtu’s to kWh’s requires the average heat rate in the state’s coal-fired electric
generating units. In 1998 coal from West Virginia averaged 12,351Btu/lb, and the state’s power plants
generated 89,008 million kWh of electricity while burning 35,132 thousand tons of coal.45 Thus the

bound. However, the likely size of this demand elasticity effect is small compared to the other
uncertainties already embodied in the scenario.
44

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Development of Modeling Inventory and Budgets
for Regional NOx SIP Call, September 1998, Table VI-1.
45

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Utility
Plants 1998 Tables, June 1999, Table ES3, and Electric Power Annual 1998, Volume 1, Tables A2
and A5.
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average heat rate is:
12,351*2,000*(35,132/89,008,000) = 9,777 Btu/kWh
Then for every ton of NOx emitted with only baseline controls, West Virginia utilities can generate:
3,053*1,000,000/9,777 = 312,263 kWh/ton NOx
Finally, using an allowance price of $1,950 and pro rating for the ozone season again gives:
(5/12)*1,950*1,000/312,263 = 2.6 mills/kWh
Thus, a marginal compliance cost of 2.6 mills/kWh is consistent with both engineering control costs and
allowance prices in the range of predicted values. The exact 2.6 mills/kWh value is a plausible, but
arbitrary, estimate of the costs of complying with the NOx SIP Call.
To get from a 2.6 mills/kWh increase in the price of electricity to percentage increases in relative costs
and prices for the REMI model, first note the average revenue per kWh sold in West Virginia in
1998:46
All Sectors:
5.1¢
Industrial:
3.8¢
Commercial: 5.5¢
Residential:
6.3¢
Next attribute half of the price and cost changes for electricity production, industrial electricity
consumption, and commercial electricity consumption to changes relative to the national price. (Note
that coal-fired generation accounted for 99.3% of electricity produced in West Virginia compared to
56.3% nationally in 1998.47) Finally, electricity accounts for 80% of the public utility sector48 and is
assumed to account for 20% of household operating expenses. Then:
Public Utilities Production Costs:
(0.26/5.1)*0.5*0.8 = 2.0%
Industrial Electricity Costs:
(0.26/3.8)*0.5 = 3.4%
Commercial Electricity Costs:
(0.26/5.5)*0.5 = 2.4%
Price of Household Operating Expenses:
(0.26/6.3)*0.2 = 0.8%
Increases in utility construction for the scenario are straightfoward. The two major utilities in the state
estimate that they would spend $670 million for NOx control equipment in West Virginia under a 0.15

46

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1998, Volume 1, Table

A15.
47

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1998, Volume 1, Tables
A1 and A2.
48

Computed from value added data in IMPLAN data files for the 1996 U.S. input-output

model.
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lbs/mmBtu standard as proposed in the SIP Call. Cost engineering data49 indicate that approximately
30% of this amount would go for on-site construction. The balance of capital costs consists of
purchased components and controls, project engineering and management, and catalyst, which are
likely to come from out-of-state. Allocating the construction expenditures over three years produces a
figure of $67 million per year.

49

Personal communication from William Pollock, AOI Consulting.
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Table 1
West Virginia Employment, Earnings & Gross State
Product (GSP) of Selected Industries
Employment Earnings*
Industry
SIC
1997
1997
West Virginia
864,305
17,355

GSP*
1997
38,228

Mining
Coal mining
Oil and gas extraction

12
13

28,843
20,289
7,457

1,492
1,284
168

3,154
2,886
204

Manufacturing
Lumber and wood products
Stone, clay, and glass products
Primary metal industries
Chemicals and allied products

24
32
33
29

85,875
12,171
6,432
11,861
15,114

3,337
290
196
637
991

6,684
447
341
827
3,065

Transportation and public utilities
Electric, gas, and sanitary services

49

45,135
10,782

1,682
597

4,672
2,605

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, State Personal
Income 1929-1997 , and Gross Product by Industry for U.S. and States, 1977-97 , CD-ROMs.
*Note: Earnings and GSP expressed in millions of current dollars.

Total Output
Baseline Forecast
NOx Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 2
Industry Output Impact of NOx SIP Call
1997
2000
2005
2010
58,541
61,109
66,990
72,331
58541
61196
66862
72153
0
87
-128
-178

Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2000
0
65
1
0
3
2
4
2
8
0

Note: Industry Output measured in millions of 1992 dollars.

2005
-6
-18
-8
-7
-57
-5
-10
-6
-11
0

2010
-8
-18
-13
-11
-86
-7
-12
-8
-14
0

2015
77,747
77537
-210

2020
82,619
82382
-237

2015
-10
-17
-17
-14
-104
-8
-14
-9
-17
0

2020
-11
-17
-21
-16
-116
-8
-16
-11
-22
0

Gross State Product
Baseline Forecast
NOx Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 3
Gross State Product Impact of NOx SIP Call
1997
2000
2005
2010
37,628
39,342
43,074
46,272
37,628
39,387
42,999
46,164
0
45
-75
-108

Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing
Government
Farm

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Note: GSP measured in millions of 1992 dollars.

2000
0
32
1
0
2
1
3
1
4
0
0
0

2005
-4
-9
-3
-3
-34
-3
-7
-4
-7
0
-2
0

2010
-6
-9
-5
-5
-52
-4
-8
-6
-8
0
-5
0

2015
49,467
49,338
-129

2020
52,354
52,209
-145

2015
-7
-9
-6
-6
-63
-5
-9
-7
-10
0
-7
0

2020
-8
-8
-8
-7
-71
-5
-10
-7
-13
0
-8
0

Total Employment
Baseline Forecast
NOx Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 4
Employment Impact of NOx SIP Call
1997
2000
2005
2010
845,701 851,324 869,950 875,142
845,701 852,504 868,715 873,658
0
1,180
-1,235
-1,484

Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing
Government
Farm

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2000
2
827
14
3
17
14
116
17
149
4
17
0

2005
-21
-215
-44
-25
-187
-37
-252
-47
-344
-10
-52
0

2010
-26
-211
-50
-30
-243
-43
-272
-59
-375
-12
-165
0

2015
879,245
877,637
-1,608

2020
877,169
875,469
-1,700

2015
-26
-193
-50
-31
-267
-47
-279
-62
-415
-14
-226
0

2020
-24
-178
-49
-33
-276
-50
-283
-63
-471
-15
-256
0

Annual Wage Rate
Baseline Forecast
NOx Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 5
Annual Wage Rate Impact of NOx SIP Call
1997
2000
2005
2010
20,295
22,460
26,083
31,539
20,295
22,465
26,085
31,539
0
5
2
0

Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2000
20
25
9
14
10
5
3
8
6
3

Note: Annual Wage Rate measured in current dollars.

2005
0
10
1
5
-39
-1
1
2
12
1

2010
3
-13
-1
8
-77
0
2
5
20
3

2015
38,013
38,020
7

2020
45,618
45,635
17

2015
19
-15
14
32
-93
9
9
22
31
9

2020
40
-11
34
63
-106
19
18
43
41
17

Table 6
Total Wages & Salaries Impact of NOx SIP Call
Total Wages & Salaries
1997
2000
2005
2010
Baseline Forecast
17,444
19,502
23,230
28,328
NOx Policy Forecast
17,444
19,534
23,199
28,281
Difference
0
32
-31
-47
Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2000
1
19
1
1
1
0
2
1
5
0

2005
-1
-5
-2
-1
-10
-1
-4
-2
-4
0

Note: Wages and Salaries measured in millions of current dollars.

2010
-2
-7
-2
-2
-16
-1
-4
-3
-5
0

2015
34,375
34,319
-56

2020
41,233
41,168
-65

2015
-2
-8
-2
-2
-21
-1
-4
-3
-5
0

2020
-2
-8
-2
-1
-25
-1
-4
-3
-7
0

Total Personal Income
Baseline Forecast
NOx Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 7
Personal Income Impact of NOx SIP Call
1997
2000
2005
2010
34,951
36,499
38,420
40,464
34,951
36,522
38,347
40,372
0
23
-73
-92

Per Capita Personal Income
Baseline Forecast
NOx Policy Forecast
Difference

1997
19,337
19,337
0

2000
20,754
20,764
10

2005
22,596
22,563
-33

2010
24,183
24,163
-20

2015
42,567
42,460
-107

2020
44,630
44,513
-117

2015
25,408
25,397
-11

2020
26,375
26,368
-7

Note: Total Personal Income measured in millions of 1992 dollars; Per Capita Income
measured in 1992 dollars.

Total Population
Baseline Forecast
NOx Policy Forecast
Difference
Differences by Sex & Age
Male
0 -14
15 -24
25 -64
65+
Female
0 -14
15 -24
25 -64
65+

Table 8
Total Population Impact of NOx SIP Call
1997
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
1,807,534 1,758,653 1,700,328 1,673,274 1,675,324 1,692,146
1,807,534 1,758,909 1,699,535 1,670,778 1,671,866 1,688,161
0
256
-793
-2,496
-3,458
-3,985
1997

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

0
0
0
0

45
26
57
0

-142
-96
-169
2

-448
-220
-570
-9

-603
-259
-832
-30

-560
-376
-992
-54

0
0
0
0

43
30
52
0

-133
-109
-147
1

-424
-238
-571
-9

-579
-257
-865
-34

-540
-362
-1038
-61
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NOx SIP Call: Wages and Salaries
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NOx SIP Call: Total Population
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